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DISMISSAL OF STOCKHOLDERS' DERIVATIVE ACTIONS AS RES JUDICATA-
THE REQUIREMENT OF NOTICE OF PROPOSED DISMISSAL
Papilsky v. Berndt, 466 F.2d 251 (2d Cir. 1972)
An earlier stockholders' derivative action against defendants' was
dismissed for plaintiff's failure to answer interrogatories. 2 The dismis-
sal, not stated to be without prejudice, was thus an adjudication on the
merits. 3  Notice of the proposed dismissal was not given to nonparty
stockholders. Plaintiff Papilsky, not a party to the dismissed action,
subsequently brought the instant derivative suit on the same cause of
action.4 Defendants claimed that the action was barred and moved for
summary judgment. Their motion was denied. On appeal, affirmed,5
held: without prior notice to nonparty stockholders, dismissal of a stock-
holders' derivative action for failure to answer interrogatories will not
bar a subsequent derivative suit by a different stockholder based on
the same cause of action.
Traditionally, for res judicata to be invoked the previous judgment
must have been final and rendered on the merits." A judgment that did
not resolve the substantive merit of a complaint would not bar another
suit on the same cause of action.' Notwithstanding common law doc-
1. White and Bernstein v. Driscoll, 67 Civ. 98, (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (unpublished
opinion).
2. In accordance with Rule 37(b) (2) (C) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
which provides sanctions for failure to allow discovery, dismissal was entered in March,
1971, as to all but the nominal defendant, Affiliated Fund, Inc. The action against
Affiliated remained pending until June, when a routine calendar order of dismissal
without prejudice was entered.
3. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b) provides in relevant part that:
Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal
under this subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other
than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, for improper venue, or for failure
to join a party under Rule 19, operates as an adjudication upon the merits.
4. Papilsky v. Berndt, 333 F. Supp. 1084 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
5. Papilsky v. Berndt, 466 F.2d 251 (2d Cir. 1972).
6. "The requirement that a judgment, to be res judicata, must be rendered 'on
the merits' guarantees to every plaintiff the right once to be heard on the substance
of his claim." Saylor v. Lindsley, 391 F.2d 965, 968 (2d Cir. 1968). Res judicata
as used in this comment refers exclusively to the estoppel effect of a prior judgment
when the same cause of action is brought a second time. See generally Vestal, Ra-
tionale of Preclusion, 9 ST. Louis U.L.J. 29 (1964); Developments in the Law-Res
Judicata, 65 HARv. L. REv. 818 (1952).
7. Ruskay v. Jensen, 342 F. Supp. 264 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (certain claims barred
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trine, Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure gives most
involuntary dismissals the effect of an adjudication on the merits, which
normally would bar further litigation.8 Although the preclusive effect
of the rule is acknowledged to apply to pre-trial dissmissals even if the
merits have not been considered,9 actions in which there was an initial
procedural bar or the defendant did not incur substantial inconvenience
and expense in preparing to meet the merits are expected.' 0 Further-
more, a prior judgment will not be accorded res judicata effect if doing
so would result in a denial of due process.:"
by previous settlement, other new claims could be asserted). Usually res judicata
could be invoked "only after a judgment has been rendered which reaches and de-
termines 'the real or substantial grounds of the action or defense as distinguished
from matters of practice, procedure, jurisdiction or form,"' Saylor v. Lindsley, 391
F.2d 965, 968 (2d Cir. 1968), citing Clegg v. United States, 112 F.2d 886, 887
(10th Cir. 1940). See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 49 (1942); Developments in the
Law-Res Judicata, 65 HARv. L. REv. 818, 836 (1952); Annot., 54 A.L.R.2d 473, 477,
480.
8. See, e.g., Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 633 (1962), aff'g 291 F.2d
542 (7th Cir. 1961); Developments in the Law-Res Judicata, 65 -ARv. L. REv. 818,
838 (1952). Unconditional dismissal may be proper in fairness to the defendant. See
Comment, Involuntary Dismissal for Disobedience or Delay: The Plaintiffs Plight, 34
U. Cm. L. REv. 922, 932-35 (1967). But see Madden v. Perry, 264 F.2d 169, cert.
denied, 360 U.S. 931 (1959). The effect of Rule 41(b) dismissals has not been uni-
form. Compare, e.g., Cosentino v. Masters, Mates, and Pilots Local 28, 268 F.2d 648
(8th Cir. 1959) (failure to comply with subpoena duces tecum not an adjudication on
the merits), with Nasser v. Isthmian Lines, 331 F.2d 124, 127 (2d Cir. 1964) (failure
to answer interrogatories was a bar). See generally Annot., 5 A.L.R. FED. 897.
9. Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958) (dictum); Stebbins v.
State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 413 F.2d 1100, 1102 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 895 (1969); Kern v. Hettinger, 303 F.2d 333, 340 (2d Cir. 1962); Fischer v.
Dover S.S. Co., 121 F. Supp. 528 (E.D.N.Y. 1954).
10. Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 285-86 (1961); Saylor v. Lindsley,
391 F.2d 965, 968-69 (2d Cir. 1968); 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRAcCE
AND PRocEDURE § 2373, at 237-39 (1972) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILLER]. But
see Weissinger v. United States, 423 F.2d 795, 799 (5th Cir. 1968).
11. In Nasser v. Isthmian Lines, 331 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1964), the court concluded
that giving res judicata effect to a prior dismissal before a hearing on the merits is
not per se a deprivation of due process:
IThe dismissal was not a punitive measure, but rather found its roots in
"the undoubted right of the lawmaking power to create a presumption of
fact as to the bad faith and untruth of an answer to be gotten from the sup-
pression or failure to produce the proof ordered."
Id. at 129, citing Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322, 350-51 (1909).
The effect of Rule 41(b) dismissal as an adjudication upon the merits is only one of
several situations in which an individual may not be heard on the merits of his claim.
In the interests of judicial efficiency and finality of litigation, the party is given a
particular time to raise his claims and if he then fails to act, further litigation is
foreclosed. See Vestal, supra note 6, at 36-54. Due process is not denied as longhttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1973/iss1/13
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The doctrine of res judicata as applied to judgments in stockhold-
ers' derivative suits is more complex because of the nature of the action.12
The stockholder's right of action as governed by Rule 23.1 is second-
ary because the stockholder is enforcing a claim that the corporation is
unwilling to pursue in its own behalf.' 3  But the cause of action belongs
only to the corporation, not the stockholder, and the alleged wrong that
the suit seeks to redress is regarded solely as one that the corporation
has sustained.' 4  Although the representative character of the plaintiff
stockholder has been variously interpreted, 15 the binding effect of the
as the party has had a fair and adequate opportunity for his claim to be heard. Cf.
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940).
12. 7A WRIGHT & MILLER § 1840; cf. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 44-46
(1940). Caution is warranted in according res judicata effect to a prior judgment
in a derivative action because the plaintiff stockholder is affecting a right that belongs
to the corporation. See note 15 infra.
13. The stockholder is allowed to assert the corporate cause of action derivatively,
based upon a supposed breach of trust by the corporate officers in their failure to
pursue the corporate claim. McLaughlin, Capacity of Plaintiff Stockholder to Termi-
nate a Stock, holder's Suit, 46 YALE L.J. 421, 423 (1936). Thus, a prerequisite to main-
taining the suit is that the plaintiff allege he has exhausted his corporate remedies. FED.
R. Civ. P. 23.1. For policy reasons why a corporation may not enforce its right of
action, see Comment, Compromise of Derivative Claims by a Corporation with Court
Approial, 52 VA. L. REv. 342, 346 (1966).
14. Where recovery is allowed, judgment is entered in favor of the corporation,
and the plaintiff gains nothing individually. See, e.g., Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531
(1970); Liken v. Shaffer, 64 F. Supp. 432 (N.D. Iowa 1946); McLaughlin, supra
note 13, at 421-23. But when plaintiff loses, he must bear the cost himself, id. at
426-27.
15. Historically a stockholders' derivative action has been viewed as a species of
class action, viz. its inclusion within Rule 23 until 1966. Describing the derivative
action as "representative," however, is ambiguous and has caused some courts to errone-
ously apply certain class action principles to stockholders' derivative actions. See Mc-
Laughlin, The Mystery of the Representative Suit, 26 GEO. L.J. 878, 902 nn.176 &
178, 903 n.179. Although "representative" is accurate as a generic term for the func-
tion that the plaintiff serves in bringing the corporate claim, the term is not used there
in the same sense as it is with reference to the plaintiffs role in present Rule 23 class ac-
tions since in a derivative action the only cause of action that exists belongs to the corpo-
ration. Scc Note, Shareholder Derivative Suits: Are They Class Actions?, 42 IOWA L.
REV. 568, 570-71 (1957). A further source of confusion is whether the plaintiff
acts as a type of fictional trustee to enforce a collective right of action by suing on the
corporate claim: H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 358; R.
STEVENS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 167, at 787-89 (2d
ed. 1949); or merely acts as a vehicle to cause the judicial machinery to operate: 4
J. POMEROy, EQurr JURISPRUDENCE § 1095, at 278 (5th ed. 1941). Courts presently
tend to think more in terms of the plaintiff as representing the corporation and not
the class of stockholders, McLaughlin, supra at 900. To view the corporate claim as
a single collective right of the stockholders, however, rather than belonging to the
corporate entity, seems most realistic, R. STEVENS, supra at 788. See generally H.
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judgment on nonparties depends upon whether the interests of the cor-
poration were fully and fairly represented. 6 Absent fraud or collusion,
a final judgment in a derivative suit would normally bar other stock-
holders from pursuing the same corporate cause of action.' 7
If a stockholders' derivative action is to be dismissed or compro-
mised, court approval and notice to nonparty stockholders is required
by Rule 23.1.18 Notice prevents any prejudice to a valid claim that
might result from a discontinuance by allowing nonparty stockholders
to intervene if a dismissal or settlement would not be in the corporation's
best interests.'" Notice also serves to discourage collusion and abuse
of the corporate claim for private gain.20  Whenever the circumstances
suggest that dismissal serves as a cloak for collusive settlements or vol-
untary abandonment, a court should require notice.2' If a claim is dis-
missed involuntarily, however, dismissal may be taken as a reflection
on the merits of the corporate claim. Policy considerations that support
HENN, supra at 749-813; Developments in the Law-Multiparty Litigation in Federal
Courts, 71 HARv. L. REv. 874, 943-57 (1958).
16. See, e.g., Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 (1970); Breswick & Co. v.
Briggs, 135 F. Supp. 397 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Winkelman v. General Motors Corp., 44
F. Supp. 960, 1018-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1942). For factors that a court should balance
in allowing a second suit, see McLaughlin, supra note 13, at 425-26. Res judicata will
not apply to judgments that relate to the representative's capacity or compliance with
the Rule 23.1 prerequisites for bringing the suit. 7A WRIGHT & MILLER § 1840, at 439.
17. See, e.g., Stella v. Kaiser, 218 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
835 (1955); Dana v. Morgan, 232 F. 85 (2d Cir. 1916); McLaughlin, supra note
13, at 424. The incapacity of other stockholders to relitigate issues already deter-
mined is derived from the corporation which is bound by the prior judgment. See
generally note 15 supra.
18. "The action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the
court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to share-
holders or members in such manner as the court directs." FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1. See
7A WRIGHT & MILLER § 1840, at 441; Hornstein Problems of Procedure in Stock-
holders' Derivative Suits, 42 COLUM. L. Rav. 574, 585 (1942).
19. Policy considerations in permitting a dismissal should be weighed by the court.
See 3B J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACmTCE 1 23.1.24 [2] (2d ed. 1953); 7A WRIGHT &
MILLER § 1839; McLaughlin, supra note 13, at 426-27.
20. Because the plaintiff has no direct stake in a successful suit, the potential for
abuse of the corporate claim by both stockholders and corporate management is con-
siderable. Stockholders may bring "strike suits" in the hope of private settlement or
to harass the corporate management. On the other hand, dishonest management may
attempt a collusive settlement or "buy-off" of the plaintiff's stock to stifle a valid suit
initially brought in good faith. "By the time a derivative suit was dismissed statutes
of limitation or laches often barred other stockholders from bringing an action of their
own and advantages already gained by litigation were lost." Haudek, The Settlement
and Dismissal of Stockholders' Actions-Pt. 1, 22 Sw. L.J. 767, 769-70 (1968).
21. 7A WRIGHT & MILLER § 1839, at 428; Haudek, supra note 20, at 778.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1973/iss1/13
Vol. 1973:219] STOCKHOLDERS' DERIVATIVE ACTIONS 223
giving notice are then considered less applicable. 22
When a suit is terminated prior to judgment, the court's role is
to safeguard the corporate cause of action, if one exists. 23  Usually, the
notice requirement of Rule 23.1 would afford nonparty stockholders
the opportunity to intervene,24 but that requirement has been inter-
preted not to apply to dismissals after a hearing on the merits.2" Thus
while the Rules give the court adequate powers to protect the corporate
claim in dealing with proposed settlements2 and voluntary dismissals, 27
strict application of the language of Rule 41 (b) might unduly compro-
mise a corporate claim that is dismissed involuntarily without any notice
to absentees.28
22. Since the suit is dismissed against the plaintiff's will, it is reasoned that there
is little fear of collusion. When the court is of the opinion that a claim is without
merit, notice is not required. National Hairdressers' & Cosmetologists' Ass'n v. Philad
Co., 4 F.R.D. 106 (D. Del. 1944); Massaro v. Fisk Rubber Corp., 36 F. Supp. 382,
386 (D. Mass. 1941). When a corporate claim becomes moot, notice to nonparties is
unnecessary. Daugherty v. Ball, 43 F.R.D. 329, 335 (C.D. Cal. 1967). See Hornstein,
supia note 18, at 591.
23. Norman v. McKee, 431 F.2d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
912 (1971). See McLaughlin, supra notel3, at 426; note 19 supra.
24. E.g., Smith v. Alleghany Corp., 394 F.2d 381, 391 (2d Cir. 1968); Cohen v.
Young, 127 F.2d 721, 725 (6th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 778 (1944); 7A
WRIGHT & MILLER § 1840, at 441-42.
25. Brendle v. Smith, 7 F.R.D. 119, 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1946); Mullins v. DeSoto
Securities Co., 45 F. Supp. 871, 886 (W.D. La. 1942); Hornstein v. Paramount Pie-
tures, Inc., 22 Misc. 2d 996, 37 N.Y.S.2d 404 (Sup. Ct. 1942); Haudek, supra note 20,
at 776. An analogy may be drawn to the notice requirement upon dismissal or settle-
ment of class actions. One must realize, however, that the judgment in Rule 23(b)(1)
or (b)(2) actions includes only those whom the court finds are described as members
of the class, and in Rule 23(b)(3) actions those who desire to exclude themselves may
do so after receiving notice of pendency. E.g., Pelelas v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 113
F.2d 629, 633 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 700 (1940) (class action); Hutchinson
v. Fidelity Ins. Ass'n, 106 F.2d 431, 436 (4th Cir. 1939) (class action). These safe-
guards do not exist when construing the effect of prior derivative actions.
26. Court approval of proposed compromises and settlements is mandatory. FED.
R. Civ. P. 23.1; Cross v. Oneida Paper Prod. Corp., 117 F. Supp. 919, 920 (D.N.J.
1954). See 7A WRIGHT & MILLER §§ 1839, 1840.
27. The court has discretion to make appropriate orders facilitating dismissal, FED.
R. Crv. P. 41(a)(2); Pittston Co. v. Reeves, 263 F.2d 328, 329 (7th Cir. 1959);
especially when the circumstances of dismissal or the plaintiff's motives are questionable,
Mashek v. Silverstein, 20 F.R.D. 421, 422 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
28. Arguably, the pattern of dismissal in the prior action, see notes 1 & 2 supra,
may have been an attempt by the district court to avoid prejudice to the corporate claim
while sanctioning the individual plaintiffs. Cf. Malcolm v. Cities Service Co., 2 F.R.D.
405, 407 (D. Del. 1942) (sale of shares did not constitute a "compromise" of the cause
of action then requiring notice, however, before the action could be dismissed subse-
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In the instant case, the court of appeals reasoned that dismissals
of derivative suits for failure to comply with discovery orders are
more analogous to voluntary than involuntary dismissals and therefore
require notice to nonparty stockholders if such dismissals are to be given
res judicata effect.29 The court's rationale allows the conduct of a
self-appointed representative to determine whether nonparty stockhold-
ers are entitled to notice of proposed dismissal under the Rules. 0 Con-
sequently the court may be placed in a position of labelling as "volun-
tary" those dismissals specified within Rule 41 (b) as involuntary in
order to avoid the effect of the rule as an adjudication on the merits;
since dismissals for lack of prosecution and disobedience of the Rules
or a court order would permit the representative plaintiff to expose the
corporate claim to abuses that Rule 23.1 was meant to prevent, notice
should be required.31
The court of appeals recognized that, for res judicata purposes,
dismissal of a stockholders' derivative action having the operative effect
of an adjudication on the merits may not be the equivalent of a judg-
ment after an actual hearing on the merits.32 Although Rule 23.1
quently notice would be required). When dismissal will not affect the right of other
stockholders to properly bring the cause of action, notice has been held unnecessary.
Marcus v. Textile Banking Co., 38 F.R.D. 185 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (dismissed for lack of
personal jurisdiction); Massaro v. Fisk Rubber Co., 36 F. Supp. 382 (D. Mass. 1941)
(failure to state a claim). Cf. Laurenzano v. Texaco, Inc., CCH FED. SEc. L. RP.
92,950 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (class action, dismissal binding only upon named plaintiffs);
Polakoff v. Delaware Steeplechase & Race Ass'n, 264 F. Supp. 915 (D. Del. 1966)
(plaintiffs were not adequate representatives of the class and therefore acted for no one
but themselves).
29. 466 F.2d at 259. Lack of opposition to summary judgment has also been viewed
as the practical equivalent of a voluntary dismissal calling for notice to absentees.
Goldfarb v. Ehlers, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,382 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Certain-Teed
Prod. Corp. v. Topping, 171 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1948). Cf. Jacobs v. Paul Hardeman,
Inc., 42 F.R.D. 595 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (plaintiff who seeks to dismiss his action is an
inadequate class representative).
30. Haudek, supra note 20, at 777.
31. See FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b), quoted in note 3 supra. The court, in its footnote
5, is not clear as to whether the exception presently created covers only dismissals for
failure to answer interrogatories or is meant to apply to other Rule 41(b) dismissals of
stockholders' derivative suits as well, 466 F.2d at 256 n.5.
32. In applying res judicata, the crucial test is whether the procedures adopted
have given the party whose rights are thus adjudicated sufficient notice and opportunity
to be heard as are required by due process and not merely whether the prior judgment
was final. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940). There are judgments which are
on the merits as to a particular plaintiff that do not bind the class. See 7A WRIGHT &
MILLER § 1840, at 439; Haudek, supra note 20, at 787. Res judicata applies with
varying effect where the prior judgment although final was rendered on a proceduralhttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1973/iss1/13
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notice provisions have been interpreted not to apply following litigation
on the merits, the reasons behind the diminished need for notice are
valid only because a court has already reached the merits of the cause
of action. 3 In the principal case the court realized that preclusion of
the corporate claim without a hearing would be inequitable, 34 but the
court should have reached that conclusion more directly.35  Rule 41 (b)
is a general provision that governs the effect of involuntary dismissals
and should not be read as abrogating the specific Rule 23.1 requirement
of notice prior to dismissal of stockholders' derivative actions.30
point, or without contest or an examination of the evidence; however, the judgment is
conclusive as to those issues actually determined. Developments in the Law-
Res Judicata, 65 HARV. L. REv. 818, 836 (1952). In determining the effect of a routine
calendar dismissal order without notice to plaintiff in a quiet title action, the Supreme
Court of New Mexico interpreted a state provision identical to Rule 41(b) of the
Federal Rules as follows: "[It applies to a dismissal of which the party affected had
notice. Notice and hearing, or an opportunity to be heard, is essential to a decision
upon the merits. Any other conclusion could well give rise to serious injustice and
that without remedy." Otero v. Sandoval, 60 N.M. 444, 445-46, 292 P.2d 319, 320
(1956).
33. "IT]he fact that the plaintiff was the first to act for the corporation does not
give him the privilege to perpetrate a wrong on the corporation any more than was
possessed by the majority." Hornstein, supra note 18, at 574.
Prior to the institution of a suit all stockholders share the same privilege to
bring an action on behalf of the corporation. . . . [T]hus if the suit is dis-
continued by the plaintiff stockholder, the right of the other stockholders to
commence the suit is revived.
McLaughlin, supra note 13, at 424.
34. To permit dismissal without notice would provide an easy device whereby
fraudulent directors could avoid future liability simply by having a cooperative stock-
holder sue and then tacitly withdraw at an appropriate time. Furthermore, notice of
proposed dismissal to nonparty stockholders protects the corporation from suffering at
the hands of a plaintiff who quite apart from the merits of the action chooses not to
comply with a discovery order. 466 F.2d at 259.
35. All of the authority cited by the court in support of its conclusion that "Rule
23.1 notice provisions do not apply to dismissals following litigation upon the merits,"
466 F.2d at 258, are decisions in which the court has actually heard the substantive
merits of the suit. On the other hand, since the court has ultimate power in passing
upon the adequacy of a settlement or the equity of a dismissal, see note 18 supra,
notice to nonparties is less necessary after a hearing on the merits.
36. There is no logical reason why the rationale used by the court in its footnote 8,
citing 3B J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.1.24 [2], at 403 (1969), should not ex-
tend to involuntary dismissals as well, 466 F.2d at 257 n.8. Although the court alludes
to the due process question as aside from Rule 23.1 notice requirements, 466 F.2d at
259-60, it seems that notice of proposed dismissal is required by the Rule to obviate
many of the doubts as to due process and adequacy of representation that might other-
wise arise. Cf. Cohen v. Young, 127 F.2d 721 (6th Cir. 1942); Winkelman v. General
Motors Corp., 44 F. Supp. 960, 1020 (S.D.N.Y. 1942). See note 40 infra.
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Rule 23.1 states that "notice of proposed dismissal or compromise
shall be given to shareholders or members in such a manner as the court
directs." Thus, if taken literally, the discretion of the court as to notice
seems limited to the manner in which notice is given. Although a strict
requirement of notice of proposed dismissal in every stockholders' de-
rivative action would be impractical, whatever reasons there are for
creating exceptions to the notice requirement" should be consistent with
the overall purpose of Rule 23.1 in protecting the corporate claim and
allowing minority stockholders a derivative right of action.88
The notice requirement of Rule 23.1 together with the require-
ment of court approval safeguard the corporate claim.." If a judgment
does not fully resolve the substantive merits of the cause of action, it is
questionable that the corporate claim has been adequately represented
before the court.40  Regardless of whether the court terms the dismissal
37. Notice is not always feasible because of the cost and the inability of the court
to enforce the requirement on an unsuccessful plaintiff. See Homstein, supra note 22,
at 591; note 28 supra.
38. Haudek, supra note 20, at 770, speaking of historical abuses of the corporate
claim states:
[Tjermination of the action without notice also served to conceal whatever
wrong had been done so that uninformed class members were unable to safe-
guard their rights. The stockholders suit was in danger of becoming a tool
for defeating the class rights it was intended to protect.
39. With reference to notice of proposed settlement the court in Cohen v. Young,
127 F.2d 721 (6th Cir. 1942), stated of Rule 23.1:
The rule provides for notice to stockholders not only in order that they may
have the right to be heard but in order that the court may have the benefit of
that broader information which comes from receiving advice . . . and consid-
ering evidence proffered by them upon the relevant points of the case.
Id. at 725. In Birnbaum v. Birrell, 17 F.R.D. 409 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), the court denied
a motion to approve a settlement because notice was inadequate, stating:
[Inadequate notice redounds to the prejudice of the objecting stockholders
in depriving the court of the advice of other stockholders who might respond
to a more extensive notice with evidence relevant to the protection of the
corporation and all of the stockholders.
Id. at 412.
40. Since Rule 23.1 allows any stockholder to maintain a derivative action if he
"fairly and adequately represents the interests of the shareholders . . . similarly situ-
ated . . ." one stockholder may quite adequately represent the corporate claim before
the court. The plaintiff stockholder need not raise every possible issue in order to
satisfy the requirements of due process. Thus it sometimes may be difficult to say at
what point a particular plaintiff does an inadequate job of representation. The possi-
bility of covert collusion makes it even more difficult, as a practical matter, to deter-
mine what the court must do with respect to nonparty stockholders to give effect to the
due process right of the corporation. The corporation is entitled to due process (H.
HENN, supra note 15, § 80), regardless of whether the stockholder bringing the
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1973/iss1/13
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voluntary or involuntary, a judgment that does not reflect fair represen-
tation of the corporate claim should not be given res judicata effect.4 1
Rather than merely citing lack of notice as the rationale for creating
another exception to the preclusive effect generally given Rule 41 (b)
dismissals, the Papilsky court should have given more weight to the un-
derlying due process considerations of Rule 23.1 and based its holding
on the rule's apparent mandate for notice.
derivative actions is viewed as a representative of the collective rights of the class or
the right of the corporate entity alone. See note 15 supra.
41. Winkelman v. General Motors Corp., 39 F. Supp. 826, 831 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).
"If there be uncertainity as to whether the issue was passed upon, the judgment is not
conclusive as evidence." Winkelman v. General Motors Corp., 44 F. Supp. 960,
1022, citing Bell v. Merrifield, 109 N.Y. 202, 211, 16 N.E. 55, 58 (1888). See note 40
supra.
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